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Abstract
Renewable electricity, particularly solar PV, creates external benefits of learning-by-doing
that drives down costs and reduce CO2 emissions. If eventually commercial, these technologies
will thereafter continue to create increasing net social value. This paper sets out a method
for assessing whether a trajectory of investment that involves initial subsidies is justified
by the subsequent learning-by-doing spillovers and whether it is worth accelerating current
investment rates. Given current costs and learning rates, accelerating the current rate of
investment appears globally socially beneficial, particularly if that investment is deployed in
high insolation locations.
1 The case for supporting PV
Solar PV has been heavily subsidized for many years, and is finally at the point of becoming
commercially viable without subsidies in some locations, but new installations continue to enjoy
significant, if now much lower, support in many jurisdictions. This paper asks whether past
and continued support is justified, and, more fundamentally, how to determine the appropriate
level of support now and in the future. While it is easy to present qualitative augments for
such support, the practical question is to quantify the level of justified support, and relate it to
observable features of the environment. The strongest case is one in which all countries recognize
∗This is an updated version of the earlier paper dated March 21 with extensions to computing the spill-over
benefits generated by various countries. An abbreviated version of the earlier paper was included as an appendix
in Newbery (2017). This paper corrects the original of June 27, 2017 by changing  to be positive to simplify the
formula, correcting the Proposition and tables, but otherwise leaving it unaltered.
†Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Director, EPRG. This paper was prompted by Neuhoﬀ (2008),
who was pessimistic about the social profitability of PV when its cost was much higher, but noted that increas-
ing current investment might relax constraints on future investment rates, which conferred an additional and
potentially large extra benefit. I am indebted to insightful comments from Rutger-Jan Lange.
1
Figure 1: PV Module price reductions
the social value of supporting immature zero-carbon technologies, of which solar PV is a leading
example, and collectively subscribe to fund that support. The Global Apollo Programme (King
et al., 2015) is one of the more recent calls for collective action, and later in the paper we consider
possible bases for subscription and allocating funds, should it gain traction.
The case for supporting solar PV (and other immature renewables) is primarily to compen-
sate for the otherwise unremunerated learning spill-overs arising from cumulative production.
Each additional installation adds to the cumulative production of solar models, which figure 11
persuasively suggests is the prime driver of cost reductions (see also Fraunhofer, 2016).
If technology developers can see a viable market for their products, they will be encouraged
to research, develop, test, and, if the results are promising, scale up production and drive down
costs. The resulting cost reductions are typically measured by the learning rate — the proportional
drop in cost per unit for a doubling of the installed capacity. While there is uncertainty not only
about past learning rates (Rubin et al., 2015) but clearly about future rates2 and even their
attribution to deployment or R&D (Jamasb, 2007; Nordhaus, 2014), the learning rates for some
1Source: Delphi234 - Own work, CC0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=33955173. The
straight green line predicts that modules decrease in price by 20% for every doubling of cumulative shipped
modules. The other line (with squares) shows world-wide module shipments vs. average module price. The data
are from ITRPV 2015 edition and can be updated to 2015 with ITRPV (2016).
2Which may be better modelled as an assembly of components each of which is subject to diﬀerent learning
rates — see Rubin et al. (2015) and references therein.
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technologies like solar PV seem impressive. ITRPV (2016), which as an industry source may be
more optimistic, claims a continuation of a 21.5% learning rate for PV modules from cumulative
production of 227 GW.3 Fraunhofer (2016) suggests a fairly steady learning rate of 23% since
1980, consistent with (EC, 2009), which reports a steady learning rate of 22% for PV since 1979.
These figures are consistent with Rubin et al. (2015) for one-factor models that attribute all cost
reductions to deployment (mean 23%, range 10-47%), while two-factor models that separately
identify R&D lower this figure to 18% (range 14-32%) (Rubin et al., 2015, table 1). To the
extent that R&D is induced by the market for the product, demand for new PV installations
will amplify the direct deployment benefit via the induced R&D, and make the overall spill-over
closer to the one-factor learning rate of 20-23%. The 2015 annual rate of PV installation was 50
GW or 28% of the installed base, which alone could cause an annual cost reduction of 6%.
The solar PV market is intensely competitive, making it hard for PV manufacturers to
capture these learning benefits, which primarily benefit subsequent installations. Patents and
licenses provide some protection of innovations, but this is a distortionary way of rewarding
producers, as the planet benefits from reducing emissions earlier, providing a strong case for
making these technologies available without a license fee to encourage their take-up and resulting
climate change mitigation. Deployment (and R&D) support is therefore preferable to hoping that
license fees and an unsupported market would lead to optimal production.
The second case for supporting solar PV (and all low-carbon technologies) is that even in
countries that have an explicit carbon price, such as the European Union with its Emissions
Trading System, that price is well below any plausible estimate of the social cost of carbon - the
present value of the future damage caused by a higher stock of greenhouse gases (Dolphin et al.,
2016; US EPA, 2016). If the carbon price-setting mechanism or carbon tax cannot be reformed
in a way that provides adequate assurance to investors in low or zero-carbon technologies, one
natural solution is to oﬀer long-term contracts with an explicit element for the carbon abatement
value. Other policies, such as the Carbon Price Support (CPS, as in Britain)4 combined with
an emissions performance standard that discourages investment in carbon-intensive generation
may provide suﬃcient investment assurance. Subsidizing the output of low-carbon generation by
the short-fall in the eﬃcient price set by more carbon-intensive generation may be a more accu-
3Subscript  refers to peak output; average output can be above 25% in favoured locations like the South-West
of the US, or as low as 10% in Northern Europe (ITRPV, 2016; EPRI, 2016). In figure 1, from data in ITRPV
(2016), the green line shows Swanson’s law, a 20% decrease in price for every doubling of cumulative shipped
photovoltaics. The blue line shows actual world wide module shipments vs. average module price, from 1976
($104/Wp) to 2015 ($0.58/Wp). Prices are in 2015 dollars. The actual decrease has been slightly greater than a
20% decrease with each doubling.
4The CPS raises the cost of CO2 emissions from electricity generation up to a pre-specified level. The additional
carbon tax (added to the ETS price) was set at £14.86 per tonne CO2 for 2016/17 (HoC, 2016).
3
rate short-run price signal but likely lacks credibility to make long-lived low-carbon investments
bankable at justifiably low interest rates.
2 Learning-by-doing cost reductions for PV
The one-factor learning model has the unit cost at date , , given by
 = −  so ∆ = (1 +∆)
− − 1 (1)
where is cumulative production of the units to date , and measures the rate of cost reduction.
The learning rate, , is the reduction in unit cost for a doubling of capacity, so setting ∆ = 
in (1),  = −∆ = 1 − 2− For  = 22%, (ITRPV, 2016)  = 0358. The factor  can then
be used to estimate the future unit cost from (1). Over longer periods of time, it is implausible
to assume that learning rates can continue until costs fall almost to zero. Equation (1) can be
modified to allow for an irreducible minimum production cost, :
 =  + − =  + (0 − )(0 )
− (2)
Initially, ∆(− ) ' ∆, and the estimated learning rate will not be much aﬀected by this
change, but at lower costs the diﬀerence can become appreciable.
2.1 Predicting unit costs
ITRPV (2016) states that the global average module price in 2015 was US$ 0.58/W, and that
the installed base at the end of 2015 was 234 GW.5 However, the module for large (100kW
systems) in the US and Europe is only 55% of the total system cost (excluding “soft costs”),
so the full system cost was then US$ 1.05/W and the assumed system price US$ 1,090/kW.
The module cost is forecast to fall to $US 0.26/W by 2026 when it will only be 36% of the
system costs, which in total fall to 68% of its 2015 value or to US$ 0.72/W. This implies that
the Balance of System (BoS) costs are projected to remain relatively constant at around US$
0.46/W, although others predict that these costs should fall with experience, R&D and learning.
NREL (2016) gives US cost estimates for the total installed cost of utility-scale installations
for Q1, 2016, based on a module price of US$(2016) of 0.64/W, and the full system cost,
including all the installation, permitting and grid connection costs and (expensive) US labour
costs, to give US$ 1.14/W for a fixed-tilt 100 MW array in Oklahoma (the cheapest state, with
non-unionised labour). The cost of a one-axis tracking unit there would be US$ 1.19/W, and
5Prices may be above or below costs. The US data discussed below are built up from cost components and will
be higher than costs in China. Properly speaking, the costs relate to a level of cumulative production that would
be lower than the end of the year value, so future cost reductions are slightly under-estimated.
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tracking is cost-eﬀective given the resulting higher capacity factor (CF, often measured in full
hours per year, or kWh/kW/yr). Installation costs should be lower in countries with lower
labour costs as the US labour element is US$ 0.16/W. If we take the average module price
(rather than the US figure) and halve the US labour cost but estimate for a tracking system,
then the 2015 starting value would be US$ 1.05/W. From now on we use a learning rate for the
whole system, not just the module, and consider diﬀerent possible values.
Estimates of the levelized cost of energy (LCoE) depend critically on location (insolation)
and local installation costs. ITRPV (2016, fig 45) forecasts costs for 2,000 kWh/kWyr (23%
capacity factor, CF, but this appears to be for tracking panels)6 as US$ 44/MWh, and this
can be achieved in sunny areas of the US. Already some Power Purchase Agreements in the US
have been signed for 20 years at less than US$ 40/MWh (indexed, without “meaningful tax state
credits”, EPRI, 2016, fn 6). European capacity factors (CFs) are lower and 1,000 hrs/yr or 11.4%
CF gives current LCoE costs of US$ 87/MWh. Estimating capacity factors is not straightforward
as it depends not on location, orientation and whether the panels track the sun.7 The data that
can be downloaded8 suggests lower CFs for fixed-tilt arrays, presumably as it refers to smaller
panels, and hence understates utility-scale performance. For the estimates presented below we
therefore take the 2015 unit cost as $1,050/kW.
2.2 Estimating the spill-over benefits of PV capacity
Investment now lowers future installation costs, and hastens the date at which PV might become
cheaper than fossil generation. If we were to take the cost reduction model of (1) or (2) at
face value regardless of the rate of investment and hence the rate of growth of experience,
then the globally optimal solution would be either to do no further investment (if PV will
never be suﬃciently competitive), or to accelerate investment at the maximum possible rate,
as the cost of delivering learning is lowest when the stock of knowledge is lowest. The cost
of doubling cumulative production from 1 GW is far lower than doubling it from 100 GW. In
mathematical terms, the optimal solution would be ‘bang-bang’ — to immediately jump to the
optimal cumulative production that delivers competitive PV from here on.
6Bolinger et al., (2016) reports that over half the US utility-scale PV installations are tracking. The median
CF for all types together in 2014 was 25.7%, and the average was 25.5% with a range from 16% to 30%. Tracking
appears to increase CF’s by 5.9% in high insolation areas, but clearly increases cost. The main determinant of CF
is the global horizontal irradiance.
7See http://euanmearns.com/solar-pv-capacity-factors-in-the-us-the-eia-data/ that discusses the very high EIA
CFs, which in California exceed 28%. Roof-top arrays are less likely to be optimally aligned, may experience some
shading and as a result may have CFs 3% less. For our purposes grid-scale PV CFs are more relevant.
8Data can be downloaded from http://rredc.nrel.gov/solar/calculators/PVWATTS/version1/ which gives both
irradiance in kWh/m2/d and in kWh/yr from 1 kW panels.
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As Neuhoﬀ (2008) cogently argued, this strategy is implausible for at least two reasons.
The first is that scaling up PV production capacity takes time, and second, more fundamentally,
learning itself takes both experience and time for that learning to disseminate and be incorporated
into best practice. Indeed, the two-factor model suggesting the importance of R&D would likely
find it hard to discriminate between R&D and the elapse of time for dissemination. It is often
remarked that Silicon Valley is more innovative than Japan because of the high turnover of staﬀ
carrying their knowledge to competing firms, in contrast to life-time employment practices in
Japan that make such people-mediated knowledge transfer less likely.
The implication is that even if current PV investment is not commercially attractive, it may
be (globally) desirable to accelerate that investment to the point that absorption becomes an
issue and the rate of innovation or cost reduction appears to falter. In practical terms that means
looking for the highest plausible rate of growth of cumulative production, and checking that this
trajectory of investment in PV is justified — if it has a positive present discounted value (PDV)
when properly accounting for the social cost of the fossil generation displaced, including the social
cost of CO2. As a check, it will appear to be socially profitable to accelerate this investment if
a small increase in investment now has a positive impact on the PDV of the trajectory, which is
an indication that the constraint limiting investment is either industrial capacity to produce, or
the fact that further acceleration would no longer deliver the assumed learning spill-overs.
This ‘constrained optimal’ cost trajectory will be determined by the amount of capacity
added each year, from which one can estimate the cost of additional units as a function of
cumulative gross investment (measured in MW). Note that the installed stock at any moment
will be less than cumulative gross investment as PV arrays only have an estimated life of 25-
30 years. Properly computed learning rates should be based on cumulative production of PV
modules as in fig.1, not the current installed capacity.
The default trajectory for PV assumed in most of the calculations below assumes a learning
rate,  = 22%, 0 = 25% and a growth rate of PV,  = 15% until 2040, after which the growth
slows to that of global electricity and penetration ceases to rise. The assumed growth rate is
conservative compared to past rates. Over the period 2010-2015, the growth rate of the top seven
countries that accounted for 80% of cumulative installations by 2015 was 44% p.a. (and for the
world as a whole was 42%). However, clearly such historic growth rates are unsustainable, and a
continued growth rate of 42% for 10 years would reach the same cumulative capacity as a growth
rate of 15% for 25 years. Germany, Italy and France (all in the top seven) have experienced
declining growth rates in the last five years compared to the previous five, indicating either
saturation or support fatigue.
The capacity factor,  = 2 000 hrs/yr equivalent to a highish value of 22% and the initial cost
6
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$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
20
15
20
17
20
19
20
21
20
23
20
25
20
27
20
29
20
31
20
33
20
35
20
37
20
39
20
41
20
43
20
45
20
47
20
49
un
it 
co
st
 U
S$
/k
W
p
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
lo
ba
l e
le
ct
ric
ity
cost per kWp
cost path 2
share of global generation
share 2
Figure 2: PV system cost and share trajectories
is $1 050/kW. Fig. 2 shows the implied unit system cost and share of PV in global electricity
production. The second set of plots (path or share 2) is based on recent projections by ITRPV
(2016), which notes that cumulative module shipments were 234 GW by the end of 2015, forecast
to rise to 850 GW by 2024. Fig. 2 takes the actual capacity in 2015 as 234 GW (assuming that
the earlier capacity now being decommissioned was negligible at that date, and assumes that
the installed capacity grows by initially 70 GW/yr rising slowly to reach 75 GW/yr by 2027
and thereafter growing at 5% faster than global electricity. Replacement investment (the actual
investment 25 years earlier) raises gross investment above this capacity expansion and it is gross
investment that drives cost reductions. Global electricity forecasts are taken from EIA (2016).
3 Modeling the benefits of PV investment
Let  be PV output at date ,  the current gross investment in PV capacity, whose unit cost
is  and total cost is ,  current PV capacity, which degrades at rate  and  be its lifetime
(assumed to occur before it has fully degraded as other components fail or become obsolete). PV
generation is  where  is the equivalent full hours output per year of PV installed at date 
and will depend on location. The rate of PV installation, , grows at rate  until date  . Total
accumulated production of PV units is , and this determines the level of accumulated learning
to date  according to (2). The amount of age  capacity remaining at  is −−,  ≤ , so if
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(  ) ≡ (1− − ),
 = 0  =
Z 
−∞
 = 0 = 

 =  − −
− −  (3)
 =
Z 
−
−(−) = ( +  )  = ( +  )  1 (4)
 =  + (0 − )(0)− =  + (0 − )−  = 
 =  = [ + (0 − )−]0 (5)
Equation (3) shows that the change in current installed capacity is the current investment, less
the amount retired that was installed  years before, and the amount that degrades in the current
year, and can be derived from the equivalent formulation in (4).
The first question to address when considering whether it is worth subsidizing current PV
is to estimate the value of future cost reductions, discounting at the social discount rate, .
Future investment costs are , given by (5). The present discounted value (PDV) of the cost
of investment at date , , assuming steady growth until date 9 is:
 =
Z 

( + (0 − )(0 )
−)−(−)
A change in current investment,  will change all future values of    , by , so the net
PDV of the cost of an extra unit of investment at  will be:

 ≡  =  −
Z 

(0 − )(0 )
−−1 0
0 
−(−) (6)
This can be evaluated at date ,10 replacing 00 by  and substituting for :
 =  + ( − )
1 + ()
³
−(+) + −()
´
 (7)
The second term in (6) is negative for    , indicating the benefit of future cost reductions.
As a fraction of the reference investment cost, 0, this spill-over benefit at date  is

0 = (1−

0 )
− − −(+)
1 + ()  (8)
To give a sense of magnitude, with a learning rate  = 22%,  = 0358,  = 15%,
 = 537%, 0 = 25%,  = 3%,  = 25, at  = 0, the learning benefit would be 42% of
the cost (and increasing in both the learning rate,  and ). The evolution of this spillover is
9Continued growth at higher than the overall growth in electricity demand is infeasible, so truncating at date
 represents a compromise that understates the spill-over, though for large  the eﬀect will be muted. Similarly
a lower average  than the current rate will understate the NPV.
10 for    is unchanged, but  is changed.
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well-defined as its time derivative is negative for    , so the benefits were clearly higher in
the past, justifying higher subsidies (assuming the whole trajectory is justified). However, the
investment cost net of the subsidy is also falling over time for    , as

 =
( − )
1 + () 
−(+) −
³
(+) − (+)
´

The net PDV of the cost of early support per unit was therefore higher, although as the number
of units was growing at rate , the total net PDV of the support cost (ignoring the benefits of
subsequent zero carbon generation) was lower in the past and increasing over time. This can be
summarised as
Proposition 1 Both the unit subsidy and the unit net PDV of the support cost decrease over
time, while the total net PDV of the support cost increases with time.
In order to justify this as a subsidy, it must also be the case that the whole trajectory is
socially profitable — it is not enough just to be able to reduce future costs if the technology
never achieves adequate future success in the market place. That will depend on the value of the
fossil fuel displaced, including the carbon benefit. The derating factor of PV,  , is the amount
of derated fossil capacity needed to meet the reliability standard that can be avoided, in total
 (0 ≤   1). In winter-peaking systems PV output is zero in peak hours so  = 0, and
the only benefit is the energy and carbon cost avoided. In summer peaking systems (with high
air-conditioning load),   0, perhaps as high as 30% with low PV penetration.
If the carbon price paid per MWh11 of fossil generation at date  is Γ, which developers
expect to rise at rate , and the PV output-weighted annual average extra variable fossil cost (fuel
+ the excess of the fossil variable O&M over the PV variable O&M less any extra balancing costs
required to manage the PV) is , both per MWh, then the profit of the PV output is (+Γ)
per year per MW PV. Ignoring the spill-over of learning benefits, and granting PV a capacity
credit of  per unit of capacity per year, where  is the payment per unit per year for de-rated
capacity,12 the net present discounted cost of a unit investment at date zero when discounting
at a commercial discount rate  is:13
0 = 0 −0 0 =
Z 
0
−[( + Γ0) + ]− (9)
11Subscript  refers to the carbon content of the electricity generated. The carbon price is the one the developers
face, not necessarily the social cost of carbon, .
12This is most readily determined in a capacity auction, or is estimated as the net Cost of New Entry, net of
sales in competitive energy and ancillary service markets.
13The assumption is that the dcveloper takes on marketing risk but will be provided with the equivalent of a
capital subsidy, e.g. via a fixed price per MWh sold up to 20,000MWh/MW. The discount rate is then the
weighted average cost of capital given the various contracts for output and capacity designed to minimise the cost
of the support.
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If  and  are constant
0 = (+  )( +) + Γ0( +−  )
If this is positive the investment will need to be subsidized to persuade developers to install
the capacity, but if it becomes negative, the developer needs no inducement (other than perhaps
a long-term contract to assure the future energy and carbon value; under most capacity market
designs the capacity payment would take the form of a long-term contract). This can be evaluated
and the results for various parameter values are shown in Fig. 3 below. The examples provided
tell us that solar PV is already commercially viable without subsidy in high insolation areas
( = 2 000 hrs/yr), but only with an adequate carbon price and reasonably low cost of capital
(Fig. 3, col B vs. Col A). In Northern Europe subsidies (or higher energy prices) would still be
necessary even with cheap finance and a reasonably high carbon price (Fig. 3, col C).
3.1 Evaluating global learning benefits
One can imagine two possible ways of organizing the Global Apollo Programme (King et al. 2015)
to deliver the PV deployment programme. The least cost solution would be to concentrate all
deployment in locations requiring the least subsidy cost at each moment. This would likely be
in the highest insolation areas provided the PV displaced fossil fuels (and the default assumed
is gas, but if coal is displaced, as in China, lower insolation could be consistent with low subsidy
rates). The more likely alternative is that the Global Apollo agreements require each country
to undertake its fair share of the subsidy and would likely concentrate support within its own
borders, unless some regional pooling could be arranged. One approach would be for the funds
collected from each participating country to be allocated by competitive auction, in which case
it might be attractive to allow all countries to bid, as this would maximize the installed capacity
for the funds collected. The outcome would then be in eﬀect a partially funded but still global
programme.
In the first case  would be initially high, but as good sites are preferentially used first, it can
be expected to decline over time as less favoured locations are developed when the high insolation
areas become saturated, driving down the local wholesale price. The annual average net value of
displaced energy, , could also fall as areas of high PV depresses local nodal prices, possibly to
the extent of driving prices down to zero in some hours, while the cost of balancing, flexibility
services, storage and interconnection increases, again lowering the average fossil displacement
value,  (Newbery, 2016). Similarly, the value of PV capacity, , will also fall as additional
PV competes less successfully with existing PV. All these elements could be given decreasing
time trends:
 = 0−  = 0−  = 00− (10)
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Figure 3: Profitability of solar PV for various parameters
so that (9) can be explicitly written and evaluated on constant growth paths:
 =  −
Z +

−[0−0− + 0−Γ0) + 00−]−
 =  − 0[0−(+)( ++  + ) + Γ0−(−)( ++  −  )] (11)
−00−( ++  )]
Fig. 3 lists the parameters that are allowed to vary in the calculations reported below. Col
A is the base case and individual diﬀerences in parameters are highlighted. (In all calculations,
 =  = 25 years,  = 3%,  = 05%,  = 15%,  = $75/kWyr,  = $10/MWh,  = 0 to
reduce the number of variations).
The social benefit of providing this stream of subsidies assumes that the future PV gross
profits once the PV costs become competitive with fossil fuel are counted as social benefits. In
addition, some of the price decline that aﬀects the commercial viability of PV would not have
occurred in the absence of the subsidy programme and so are additional spillover benefits reaped
by consumers. The simplest assumption is that without PV, fossil prices would not decline, so
all of the price decline is a consumer benefit. The other adjustment to make is that the carbon
price that developers face may understate the global social cost of carbon, and the rate at which
developers assume the carbon price will be allowed to rise may again diﬀer from that of the social
cost. As before, we use capitals to denote the carbon market price, Γ and an expected rate of
growth , and lower case for the social values,  and .
The total net social benefit of this trajectory, discounting at a social discount rate of , is
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then the social gains accruing to other parts, 0, less the cost of the required subsidies, 0:
0 = −0 + 0, where 0 =
Z 
0
−, and (12)
0 =
Z 
0
[(0 − 0−) + 0 − Γ0]−
The PDV of the required unit subsidy, 00, is:
00 = 0[(0)( −   ) + (1− 0)( − (1− )  )]
−0[0( ++  + )( +  +  −   )
+Γ0( ++  −  )( +  −  −   )]− 00( ++  )( +  −   )
The remaining corrective social benefits can also be evaluated replacing 00 by ( +  ):
00 = 0( +  )[0{( +  −   )− ( +  +  −   )}
+0( +  −  −   )− Γ0( +  −  −   )]
The two components of 00 and their sum are shown for various parameter values in Fig.
3. (The highlighted values indicate changes from the base case shown in Col A. If   0, all
benefits will be somewhat decreased.) The base case shows that while privately unprofitable
without subsidy, 0 is negative, so providing the future fossil savings can be clawed back or
counted as social gains, the trajectory has positive social value even ignoring the spill-overs, 0.
Allowing for declining  and , ( =  = 1%), Col E shows unsubsidized PV unprofitable
(at  = 7%) but socially profitable. Lower insolation ( = 1 200 hrs) requires a lower market
weighted average cost of capital, WACC, ( = 5%) to be socially profitable (Col D). Lowering
the learning rate , (Col H vs Col E) lowers social profitability, as does raising the minimum PV
cost (Col I) in this case making the trajectory unviable, but see section 2.3 below. Rasing the
rate of growth, , can oﬀset quite a large fall in , (col J).
3.2 A decentralized Apollo Programme
If the funds for supporting PV cannot be directed to developers with the least required subsidy
across the globe, then at best regional support programmes could achieve this regionally with
some loss of average insolation, lowering the average value of , but perhaps, through using
a wider set of countries, decreasing the rates of cannibalization. We can test this by setting
 = 1 200 hrs,  =  =  = 0 in (10), and an average value of  = 5%, as shown in Fig. 3
Col F. Viability with lower insolation and/or higher rates of cannibalization would require lower
discount rates, higher market and/or social carbon prices and/or higher wholesale prices.
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3.3 Accelerating investment - deviations from steady growth
The next test is whether it would be desirable to accelerate investment now or delay it. Consider
the net benefit of a small increase in initial PV investment, 0, leaving future investment at
0 unchanged. 0 will be increased by 0, and so will ,   , but by diminishing amounts
as a result of degradation. ,   , will be unchanged. Future cumulative investment  will,
however, be permanently raised by 0 and so 0 = 1. The net benefit of this small increase
can be found by diﬀerentiating (12):
0
0 = −
0
0 +
0
0  where (13)
0
0 = 0 +
Z 
0
 0 
−
0
0 =
Z 
0
[0− 0 {(0
− − 0) + 0 − Γ0}]−
These can be evaluated by noting that 0 aﬀects all future costs:
 0 = 

0 = (0 − )− (

0 )
−−1 0
0 = −(0 − )
−(1+) so
0
0 = 0 − 0(1− 0)( +   ) (14)
In contrast  is only aﬀected for  periods, and 0 = −, so
0
0 = 0
Z 
0
[(0 − 0−) + 0 − Γ0]−(++) (dS/dI0)
0
0 = 0[0{( +  +  )− ( +  +  + )}+ 0( +  +  −  )− Γ0( +  +  −  )]
The eﬀects of raising the current rate of investment are shown in the last line of fig. 3.
Note that while Col I shows the trajectory to be socially unprofitable, raising the rate of current
investment would improve social value, so there may be another initially higher trajectory with a
positive social value. The implication is that accelerating the rate of investment in PV is globally
socially justified in all these cases. More important, a global programme to fund continued
investment in solar PV seems socially justified, particularly if it can be located in good resource
locations, and evaluated using a sensible carbon price and public sector (low) discount rate.
4 Individual country contributions to the public good
It is possible to compute the value of each country’s contribution to reducing future costs by its
current and previous investment, either roughly or more accurately. The rough estimate takes
the estimated unit cost  from (2) and the amount of capacity added in that year, using (8) to
estimate the spill-over benefit, but replacing 0 by , and using the assumed growth rate,  and
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learning rate, . That would considerably underestimate the subsequent growth rates up to 2015
and hence underestimate the present value of the spill-over benefit. Recent cost declines have if
anything been faster than average, judging from Figure 1, which might suggest a higher learning
rate. However, some of that cost fall may be competitive shading of margins rather than genuine
cost reductions, and so there is as yet no compelling evidence that learning is accelerating.
Working back from the current cost to earlier costs using (2) might undervalue those costs and
hence the learning benefits, again erring on the conservative side. A more accurate estimate
would track the evolution of cumulative capacity more accurately instead of assuming a constant
global growth rate.
Under the approximate constant growth rate approach, the spill-over benefit per kW in-
stalled in year  from (6) is  ≡  −  or
 = (0 − )(
− − −(+) )
1 + ()  (15)
With the default assumptions that  = 2040,  = 537%,  = 3%, 0 −  = $788, and 
includes the five years from 2010 (accounting for over three-quaters of cumulative capacity), we
can calculate the spill-over value each year and, given the cumulative capacity installed in each
country shown in Figure 4,14 the total spill-over by country in Figure 5 (calculated from the
spill-over per kW in Figure 4 and the annual increments to capacity).
4.1 Funding a global Apollo Programme
The spill-overs calculated in Figure 5 are substantial and unequally divided, with the top two
countries contributing nearly half the subtotal identified. It is interesting to ask how this total
sum might have been made available for subsidy support globally under some international
agreement along the lines of the Global Apollo Project. Figure 6 shows cumulative emissions
for countries accounting for 80% of CO2 emissions since 1950, and their share in the global total
over that period.15
If, plausibly, countries were asked to contribute on the basis of their past contributions
to the stock of CO2, then the US might be asked to contribute 25% whereas of the subset of
countries in table 2, it contributed 11% of the global spill-over benefits (the table accounts for
80% of cumulative investment). China over-contributes (18% compared to a 14% CO2 share)
14Figures taken from Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Growth_of_photovoltaics. Detailed notes on
sources are provided there. Global figures 2012-15 are taken from ITRPV (2016) and for 2010-2011 extrapolated
backwards from (incomplete) country totals.
15Source: CAIT Climate Data Explorer. 2017. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available online
at: http://cait.wri.org
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Figure 4: Installed capacity (GW) and spillover ($/kW)
Figure 5: Spillover value ($ million) per year and cumulative
15
Figure 6: Emissions of CO2 by country and share of total emissions from 1950-2013
as does Germany (20% compared to 5%) and Italy (11% compared to 2%). The other countries
contribute roughly twice as much as their share in global emissions.
A proper global programme would collect funds according to some criterion such as cumula-
tive contributions to the current CO2 stock (perhaps progressive with GDP/head and cumulative
emissions per head as part of the formula) and allocate them eﬃciently. That would be achieved
by an annual auction for the least amount needed to deliver the annual target, payable per MWh
delivered up to some total per kW installed (e.g. 20MWh/kW). That would encourage de-
livery (i.e. proper installation, connection and maintenance) and allocations to places of high
insolation and high avoidable fossil costs. An additional requirement might be an explicit carbon
tax or equivalent subsidy to zero-carbon generation.
The decision on the annual amount to auction will need to balance the supply of suitable
sites with the manufacturing capacity of the solar PV industry, and would ideally provide cred-
ible commitments for suﬃciently far into the future to justify building new PV manufacturing
capacity. As PV prices fall, the amount of subsidy required will fall below the future value of
the spill-overs, although as better sites are used up, the time taken to earn back the installation
costs will rise and tend to oﬀset the fall in installation costs.
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5 Conclusions
The models demonstrate how to judge whether current and proposed future rates of investment
in solar PV are justified, given assumptions about the future prices of fossil fuel and carbon
displaced, as well as, critically, the learning rate and discount rate, the projected future growth
path and insolation in the supporting countries. In the decentralized Apollo Programme, the
average insolation will be lower but might change more slowly, and the viability of the Programme
is more marginal, but even here raising the rate of investment looks attractive. The method here
has been applied to constant growth cases as for such there are explicit formulae that allow a
study of the impact of changing particular assumptions, but the approach can be readily extended
to any projected PV trajectory, such as the second case in Fig 2, using the original formulae with
time subscripts and spreadsheets to evaluate the annual values.
Given a more fully reasoned model of how learning disseminates and the role of induced
(or planned) R&D, it might be possible to compute the optimal trajectory, which would almost
certainly start with higher rates of investment, falling over time as the costs of subsidizing an
ever larger investment rise while the future cost reductions decline. In this simplified model, the
main conclusion is that accelerating the current rate of investment appears socially attractive
under a wide range of assumptions.
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